Adopter
Adopter only when when p-value price is price is of Control low high diff.
(1)
(2) (3) Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report sample means for "adopters when the price is low" and "adopters when the price is high," respectively, at the time of the baseline survey. Column 3 reports p-values of the difference between the means. The basic political awareness indicator captures whether the household head was able to correctly identify the presidents of Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States. Monthly earnings (USD) includes the respondent's profits from businesses and selfemployment, salary and benefits from employment, and agricultural sales for the entire household.
Appendix Notes: This table presents correlations between six respondent and household characteristics that were observed at baseline, and appear to be important differences between "adopters only when the price is low" and "adopters when the price is high," as shown in Appendix Table 2 . These include whether the household respondent (1) attended secondary schooling; (2) is not a farmer;
(3) is employed; and (4) has a bank account; (5) estimated monthly earnings (USD), which includes the respondent's profits from businesses and self-employment, salary and benefits from employment, and agricultural sales for the entire household; and (6) estimated value of assets at baseline. These six variables are combined to construct a baseline measure of "Social and Economic Status." We then construct a binary variable, SES, indicating whether a household falls into the upper quartile of this measure. SES is then used as an interaction variable in instrumental variables regressions estimating the impacts of household electrification, in order to explore heterogeneity. We can compare the results of this approach to the alternative approach presented in the paper, and shown in Appendix Table 1 .
Appendix Table 4 : Local average treatment effects with high "Social and Economic Status" interaction Table 3 for a list of components). Regressions are estimated using only round 1 data (roughly 16 months post-connection). All specifications include pre-specified household, student, and community covariates, excluding those captured in SES. See Appendix Table B6A in Lee, Miguel, and Wolfram (2019) for additional results. Robust standard errors clustered at the community level in parentheses. Asterisks indicate coefficient statistical significance level (2-tailed): * P < 0.10; * * P < 0.05; * * * P < 0.01.
Appendix Note 1. Sources for historical rural electrification initiatives
In Table 1 , we summarize some of the historical rural electrification initiatives evaluated in the recent microeconomics literature. In general, electrification rates are obtained from various studies, including those cited in the paper, as well as World Bank Open Data. GDP figures are calculated using GDP and CPI statistics from World Bank Open Data. Annual average exchange rates are obtained from the International Monetary Fund. The costs of electrification initiatives are obtained from various sources. Unless otherwise indicated, the reported cost is assumed to be in current prices of the year in which it is reported. All costs are then converted to 2017 USD. The following is a list of the references that were consulted. (Heckman and Vytlacil (1999 , 2001a , 2001b , 2001c , 2005 , 2007a , 2007b ), it can also be represented as weighted average of sub-LATE's. This means that if we obtain a LATE using an instrumental variable, it can be represented as a weighted average of sub-LATE's for more narrowly defined complier subgroups. Therefore, the first step to calculate LATE's for different complier groups is to estimate the share that each complier group represents in the sample. Under randomization, we only need to make a standard assumption of monotonicity (Angrist, Imbens 1994) to get unbiased estimates of these shares.
In our experimental situation in which there are different randomized subsidy levels across treatment villages, we can define complier group c1 as those individuals who take up a grid connection when offered the low subsidy but not when offered no subsidy; those who take up power even without a subsidy are the "always takers". Those who only take up a connection when offered at least the medium subsidy are called c2, and those who only connect under the full subsidy (free treatment) are c3. The monotonicity assumption is equivalent to assuming that if individual i takes up treatment under a low subsidy, they would also take it up if offered the medium or full subsidy. This leads to the following logic: if x% of the control group take up a connection (without a subsidy), then x% of the entire sample are always takers. Then if y% of those offered the low subsidy take up treatment, we assume there is the same share of always takers in this treatment group, and therefore y% − x% corresponds to the share of c1 compliers. Next, if z% of those offered the medium subsidy connect, then z% − y% − x% corresponds to the share of c2 compliers, since always takers and c1 compliers would also take up treatment under the medium subsidy. Following the same logic we can estimate the share of c3 compliers and never takers. We will denote these shares as π at , π nt , π c1 , π c2 , and π c3 .
Along with these shares, estimating the LATE for c1 compliers (LATEc1) is straightforward, since it simply corresponds to the 2SLS regression of an outcome on the low subsidy (using only control and low subsidy observations). If we estimate a 2SLS regression of an outcome on the medium subsidy, we are estimating a weighted average of LATEc1 and LATEc2, since the compliers at the medium subsidy level include those who would not have complied under the low subsidy, but also those who would have connected under a low subsidy if it had been offered. We call this weighted average LATEc1,c2. This same logic applies to the full subsidy.
Exploiting the monotonicity condition yields the following key expressions, which are similar in notation to those presented in Kowalski (2016):
For c3 compliers:
Baseline characteristics
The LATE's estimated implicitly come from the identification of the different complier groups using the monotonicity assumption. For example, LATEc2 is just the difference between the average outcome for the c2 compliers who were treated and the c2 compliers who were not. When it comes to baseline characteristics, it means we can identify the average for each complier group and treated/untreated combination. Following Abadie (2002) , a number of studies have aimed to empirically identify the characteristics of different complier subgroups (for examples, see Card 2019; Mountjoy 2019; and Kline and Walters 2016). Here, we are able to calculate average baseline values corresponding to the combination of treated and untreated compliers within each subgroup using the assumption of monotonicity and the basic formula for weighted averages. As an example, consider the average characteristics X for those connected under the low subsidy. This average is a weighted average of the characteristics of the always takers and the treated c1 compliers. Since we can identify the always takers in the control group, we can back out the average characteristics for the treated c1 compliers. Similarly, the average characteristics X for those who remain unconnected under the medium subsidy is a weighted average of the never takers and those who only comply under the full subsidy, c3 compliers. Since the never takers are identified through those unconnected under the full subsidy, we can back out the average characteristics of the untreated c3 compliers. The following equations use the shares we previously described, T = 1 to represent treated (connected) households, and Z 1 , Z 2 , and Z 3 to represent the low, medium, and full subsidy respectively:
For treated compliers:
For untreated compliers:
In Appendix Table 2 , we compare baseline characteristics for each complier subgroup. Specifically, we present the minimum variance weighted average for each subgroup, instead of presenting them separately for treated and untreated households. Furthermore, we present a weighted average (using their shares) of the baseline characteristics and LATE's of complier subgroups c1 and c2, primarily because π 1 and π 2 are quite small and thus pooling the data leads to more statistical power. There is also a meaningful conceptual distinction between those willing (and able) to pay "something" for a connection, versus those who only connect when it is completely free. As noted above, the weighted average for c1 and c2 is just the LATE and the average characteristics for medium subsidy treatment group compliers, and in this case the relevant sub-LATE can be obtained directly from that IV estimate.
To be able to estimate the standard errors for the LATE's and the baseline characteristics, we need to estimate a full covariance matrix, given the covariance terms that appear in the expressions above. To do this, we employ a stacked regression approach, which is numerically equivalent to a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach. This allows for a straightforward estimation of the analytical standard errors, rather than having to rely on bootstrapped estimates. All of the data and code that generated the results are in this article's replication files.
